Abstract
INTRODUCTION
The nature of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) as an international judicial institution is predetermined by the necessity to seek precise and consistent reasoning for particular outcomes in individual cases. However, the norms of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) are frequently abstract and far from being straightforward. When the wording of the ECHR is not precise enough the Court has to look for additional sources such as the laws of the Contracting Parties, 1 relevant international treaties, 2 internal developments within the respondent State 3 as well as other sources. The Court has deployed these sources to clarify the meaning of the ECHR and the Protocols which are the only ones legally binding and support a particular outcome of a case and, therefore, such sources serve a persuasive purpose emphasizing particular interpretations.
This paper argues that alongside the classical distinction between binding and persuasive legal sources the Court uses comparative data, prepared in its comparative law report, for an informational purpose. A comparative law report does not advocate a particular approach but rather presents a spectrum of possible outcomes of a particular issue. 4 Such reports inform the Court about the context in which a particular legal phenomenon operates in different European countries.
One can suggest that if a comparative survey reveals a trend in Europe then such a survey is more likely to be used for a persuasive purpose. However, deployment of comparative law for a persuasive purpose is not clearly dependent on whether the comparative survey reveals a common European trend in relation to a particular legal issue. Sometimes, a lack of 
LEGITIMACY OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS
The judgments of the ECtHR should be legitimate in order to ensure State compliance, 11 and the legitimacy of the ECtHR is based on the consent of the States that agreed to be supervised. 12 However, it seems farfetched to suggest that the Contracting Parties a prioiri 10 The interviewed judges of the ECtHR mentioned that they use comparative analysis as a source of background information and of alternative solutions to a certain legal problem. Lech Garlicki mentioned that he was a Judge-Rapporteur in Demir and Baykara v. Turkey. He pointed out that 'we decided that we would like to have this information [comparative research]. And it also was partly because collective labour law is not my field and I wanted to be better informed'. Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Lech Garlicki. Judge Šikuta pointed out that 'a comparative report or study is a source of information. The more information the judge has the better it is. He/she can take more issues into account, can evaluate them, can make balancing exercise. Better and more informed decision will be delivered'. Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Ján Šikuta. 11 Dzehtsiarou, loc.cit note 9, p. 535. 12 In classical international law the jurisdiction of international organisations was entirely dependent on the consent of the Member States, and while it plays a less important role in contemporary international law theory it still possesses a legitimising potential. Kumm, M., ' 20 Dahl argued that 'even the best-designed judicial system can guarantee only procedural justice; it cannot guarantee substantive justice. A constitution can ensure a right to a fair trial; it cannot absolutely guarantee that a fair trial will always lead to the right verdict. But it is precisely because no such guarantee is possible that we place such a high value on a fair trial'. 25 Raz has constructed a so called 'normal justification thesis'. He argues that authority should be obeyed if it can be shown that 'the alleged subject is likely better to comply with the reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directive) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.' Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom, Clarendon, Oxford, 1988, at p. 53. If Razian theory is correct then legitimacy of the order is dependent on the content of the order rather than on the process through which it was adopted.
legitimacy through outcome-related reasons. He argued that 'outcome-related reasons are reasons for designing the decision-procedure in a way that will ensure the appropriate outcome (i.e., a good, just, or right decision)'. 26 According to Waldron, rational disagreement is possible in assessment of judgments, namely some people can think that they are just, right or good while the others can rationally disagree. 27 This article argues that while disagreement about these categories is possible, the Court is likely to produce a "good, just, or right decision" if all relevant information is duly taken into account. Information about legal regulation of a matter in European and non-European countries other than the respondent State or States is a valuable source of information for the Court. French points out:
[I]nterpreting a treaty through reference to other law permits a tribunal to ensure that the narrow application of a rule is not allowed to overrule broader notions of justice. By referring to other rules of law, a tribunal can seek to provide for a more just answer than one that a restricted interpretation might otherwise give.
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Decision-making informed by comparative law is not a panacea against "bad" decisions;
"wrong", "unfair", "biased" choices are still possible. However, it seems commonplace to say that an informed decision-maker is less likely to make a "bad" decision. 29 Moreover, and not less important for legitimacy, an informed decision seems to present itself as more fair and better. Therefore, decision-making explicitly informed by comparative law increases the substantive legitimacy of the judgments produced by the ECtHR. One can most vividly distinguish between these purposes by considering the part of the judgment where the comparative data is mentioned and the degree of direct influence the data has on the outcome of the case. 34 If the comparative data appears to be explicitly acknowledged in the reasoning of the judgment and explicitly affects the outcome, one can conclude that it has served a persuasive purpose. If conclusions of comparative analysis are mentioned in the judgment but they have no explicitly acknowledged effect on the reasoning, or if comparative research was conducted but it is not even mentioned in the reasoning then the comparative data serves an informational purpose.
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In a number of cases, the ECtHR used comparative data to decide about the presence or The comparative analysis in this and similar cases serves a persuasive purpose since the ECtHR supports its finding by referring to the laws accepted in the majority of the Contracting Parties. It appears unnecessary to go further into the detailed examination of this purpose, since, unlike the informational purpose, it has received a much greater degree of scholarly attention.
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As regards the informational purpose of comparative law, the apparent limitation of this research is that comparative law reports prepared by the Registry of the ECtHR are confidential. Moreover, it is not publicly available whether such reports are prepared in a particular case or not. For that reason, it is not possible to claim definitively that there are cases where comparative analysis is done but is not mentioned in the text of the judgment at all. The plausible conclusion about availability of such cases can be drawn from information shared by the judges during the interviews with one of the authors. For example, Judge Šikuta maintains that comparative research is conducted in nearly all Grand Chamber cases, 39 but the judgments in all these cases do not necessarily contain summaries of comparative research.
In some cases, a comparative report is not referred to in the final judgment due to some limitations. Judge Tulkens points out:
[I]n the Lautsi Chamber case -we had 17 countries with different situation from one country to another. But at the end of the day we decided not to use 37 Ibidem, para. 61. 
Abandoned Comparative Data?
There are cases where the ECtHR quotes the summary of the comparative research but makes The refusal to renew authorisation of occupancy and the measure ordering the applicant to restore the site to its condition prior to the construction of the house correspond to a concern to apply the law consistently and more strictly, having regard to the increasing need to protect coastal areas and their use by the public, but also to ensure compliance with planning regulations. Having regard to the appeal of the coast and the degree to which it is coveted, the need for planning control and unrestricted public access to the coast makes it necessary to adopt a firmer policy of management of this part of the country.
The same is true of all European coastal areas.
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No more reference was made to comparative law in the reasoning of the judgment and no violation of Article 1 of the Protocol 1 was found in this case. It seems safe to suggest that the ECtHR did not use comparative data here as a compelling argument.
No consensus could be identified from the comparison and therefore it does not seem that comparative analysis is included in the judgment for the purpose of persuasion. 57 Ibidem, para. 52. 58 Ibidem, para. 53. 59 Ibidem, para. 54. 60 Ibidem, para. 81. 61 Ibidem, para. 54.
Moreover, a lack of consensus or common practice was also not explicitly acknowledged by the Court.
Irrelevant Comparative Law?
There are cases where the ECtHR quotes comparative analysis and refers to it in its reasoning but states that it is not relevant to the matter at issue. In Burden v. the United Kingdom, 62 the issue was whether cohabiting sisters can be treated equally with married couples and same sex partners in civil partnership for the purposes of inheritance tax. A husband inheriting from a wife or a wife inheriting from a husband is exempt from the inheritance tax in the United Kingdom. The same applies to a partner of the same sex partnership inheriting from another partner. However, the cohabiting siblings would have to pay the inheritance tax.
Chapter 3 entitled 'Relevant comparative law and material' was included in the judgement.
This chapter contained comparative analysis of the domestic legislations of some of the Contracting Parties regarding the issue, although the ECtHR did not identify any commonly accepted standard in the area.
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The ECtHR acknowledged that the legislation in respect to inheritance taxes is diverse in somewhere between the "supportive" and "minor influence" points of the spectrum employed in this study. However, there are instances where a foreign authority has been treated as a persuasive authority.
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Since comparative law used by the ECtHR also can be deployed for persuasive and informational purposes the following points from the studies of domestic legal systems are relevant to the ECtHR. The first concerns the legitimacy of the use of foreign precedent in constitutional adjudication at all. This is the ground on which Justice Scalia objected to the reference to German federal practice in Printz, when he wrote that comparative analysis is 'inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one'. The second ground of opposition is the potential for abuse or, less pejoratively, misuse, of foreign law, in terms of either judicial or comparative method. Saunders C., 'The Use [T]he fact remains that law extraneous to the Court's own case law has gained ground, and is increasingly gaining ground, in the ECHR's mode of operating before it reaches a decision. This is a good sign for the founders of a court of law protecting values which by their nature are inherently indivisible and global.
The Sources Should be Acknowledged
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While disagreeing on the weight that the ECtHR should attach to comparative data the judges seem to see comparative law as a valuable source of information that can give them an impression about the general legal framework in Europe and provide information about other possible solutions in similar circumstances.
To sum up the ECtHR is willing to use comparative analysis in its decision-making process.
Not only does such a tendency coincide with the current views and trends in legal scholarship and practice, but it proves to be highly useful for the Court itself, allowing it to see a bigger picture of the European context, and supplying an array of possible solutions. Whether the judges in a specific case decide to reproduce, or not, the findings of the comparative analysis there is no doubt that comparative law is indeed used both for persuasive and informational purposes.
However, it is clear that for the ECtHR the use of comparative law in decision-making is far from being conceptually and methodologically settled; even less so when it is used for informational purpose only. The Court faces a complex task of transparently delineating the cases in which comparative law merits mentioning in the reasoning and where it does not.
Both the academic sources and practice demonstrate the legitimising potential of the decision informed by the foreign and comparative experience, but at the same time the broader use of these sources would necessitate significant changes to the existing approaches. The foreign sources need to be openly acknowledged and the comparative law analysis should not be left outside the text if the substantive legitimisation is to be achieved.
The use of comparative law for informational purpose is a novel technique in the "arsenal" of the ECtHR, providing the intellectual richness and flexibility of argumentation; however, it needs to be properly applied to ensure a positive effect. The rather welcoming attitude of the judges and the Registry to comparative sources suggests that such accommodation will unlikely encounter excessive obstacles.
PARTICULAR ISSUES OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
If comparative data is collected for informational purposes this data should be adequate and reflect the current regulation of a particular legal issue in the laws of the Contracting Parties.
Otherwise, misrepresentation can distort the legal basis of the findings and compromise the position of the Court as a competent and independent arbiter in human rights disputes because inadequate and misleading comparative information can reduce substantive legitimacy of the judgments. If national judges and lawyers find out that their national law was presented inadequately, they will become dissatisfied with the judgment and their dissatisfaction can damage the legitimacy of the judgment.
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When a Judge-Rappoteur requests a comparative analysis he is not in a position to predict for what purpose the report completed by the Research Division will ultimately serve. Therefore, from the outset, comparative law research should be designed in a manner that permits both persuasive and informational use. It is inevitable that only a small part of the comparative research will be reproduced in the final judgment of the Court, and, thus, it seems logical that if the Court is using comparative data for informational purposes the results of the analysis may be presented in more general terms. In cases where the comparative research is used for persuasive purposes, it is desirable for the ECtHR to present a more detailed account of the research.
'CHERRY-PICKING' CHALLENGE
The so-called 'cherry-picking' challenge is one of the most common points of criticism of any comparative analysis regardless of its scope and potential use. The persuasive use of comparative analysis is essentially linked to establishing the presence or absence of a European consensus about a legal issue. 85 Consequently, any such attempt to persuade will largely depend on the ability of the Court to show that a conclusion as to a consensus has a reliable empirical basis. The persuasive use of comparative analysis demands a choice of jurisdictions that is representative and free of bias.
Informational purposes of comparative analysis in ECtHR case law allows for a less rigid set of rules for choosing comparators. The desired effect of an analysis aimed to inform the Court, Contracting Parties and the public is achieved by showing an array of existing and possible solutions to a problem, rather than by persuading that a certain solution is the most plausible. However it is not suggested here that information used should not be carefully verified but that its representation in the judgment can be reduced to a necessary minimum.
It seems that frivolous cherry-picking would undermine the validity of an analysis, but picking up illustrative solutions appears to be justified in satisfying the informational purpose. The informational purpose does not necessarily call for a selection to be representative, because on some occasions the ECtHR might wish to highlight unconventional and/or extreme approaches. Moreover, selective representation of comparative analysis is arguably inevitable considering the fact that the ECtHR is constrained 84 Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Corneliu Bîrsan. 85 Dzehtsiarou, loc.cit. note 9.
by the need to be reasonable in expanding the length of a judgment and, thus, unable to outline the minutiae of the Registry's report.
CHOOSING PROPER COMPARATORS: REASONS VERSUS OUTCOMES.
Comparative analysis conducted by the ECtHR is not aimed at explaining the differences and commonalities between different legal systems which is very often the case with respect to academic comparative research. de Cruz points out:
A systematic comparison which is the essence of comparative law, seeks to explain the similarities and divergences between the legal systems selected for comparison. The reasons for these differences and similarities are very often extra-legal and cannot be causally linked to any legal rule or principle.
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Occasionally, the ECtHR's comparative analysis focuses on descriptive rather than analytical aspects. The Research Division provides a description of the ways a particular legal matter is regulated in the Contracting Parties and does not explain the similarities and differences indepth. In Layla Sahin v. Turkey, the ECtHR included the results of the comparative law research in the judgment without making any major attempts to carry out detailed analysis of the reasons behind them because the ECtHR appeared to be more interested in the outcomes themselves.
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Significantly, it was mentioned by Judge Spielmann that in an ideal situation the reasons for adopting a particular solution by the States could assist the Court in coming to the most adequate and appropriate decision. In particular, the inquest into the reasons behind the absence of relevant legislation in a particular field could be enlightening in appraising the reasons for a lack of consensus in certain domains. 88 However, research revealing all of the complicated sets of political negotiations bringing a particular solution into a national legal system can only be conducted if an in-depth analysis is carried out. This would need to take into consideration the legislative history of a particular bill, lobbying and stakeholders' behaviour, legislative traditions, media coverage, social stereotypes, convictions of the members of parliament, and multiple other factors. 89 Yet, it seems implausible to be fully convinced that the true and precise reasons were discerned and that no factor was omitted or misinterpreted. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that after all the research and analysis has been carried out, the Court will inevitably face the question of whether these reasons still matter for interpretation. The best illustration of the complexity of such endeavours is the infamous originalism debate concerning the interpretation of the US Constitution. 90 While it may be impossible to set out clearly the reasons which led a specific national jurisdiction to adopt a certain solution to a legal problem, comparative analysis does not need to avoid these attempts altogether. Various hints as to the underlying reasons might be obtained by deducing the inner logic of a particular legal solution. Arguably, the basic methodological principle of comparative law -functionality -is in itself aimed at the same goal. has been accepted. In English business circles however, it is very often considered unfair to revoke an offer, and so it is not done.
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Functional equivalents and specific outcomes are both preceded and predetermined by the underlying reasons which led to the adoption of a specific legal scheme. A serviceably good understanding of these reasons can be deduced through the reconstruction of the inner logic of functional equivalents. Basically, the analysis should follow the reverse path -from outcomes to reasons. However, it is crucial to keep the scrutiny focused on functionality itself. A profound understanding of a legal problem can be achieved through the appreciation of the legal means employed, their place in a legal system, the social, political, and cultural environment. All of these elements combined reveal the inner logic of a functional equivalent, and it might well be anticipated that this logic will expose the reasons for the adoption of a certain approach. 
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The Court is not in a position to quote in full a comparative report prepared by the Research Division. 99 However, even a short quote such as the one outlined above shows that the Court is making an informed decision. 105 However, comparative analysis will not seriously affect the length of proceeding since it is only deployed in the complex cases, while the reason for the lengthy procedure in the ECtHR is an overwhelming amount of repetitive cases.
violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The ECtHR summarised the amicus curiae brief in the judgment 115 and relied on it in its reasoning. 116 The judges interviewed for this study attached different values to the amicus curiae briefs submitted by NGOs. Most of them pointed out that such amicus curiae briefs reflect the biases of the NGOs that draft them. 117 Judge Jaeger was of the opinion that quoting an NGO's amicus curiae brief 'is nothing more than a matter of politeness. The Court tries to strengthen human rights NGOs in their role and, therefore, it acknowledges their reports in the judgments. However, the main role of NGOs is on the implementation stage'. 118 It should be noted that the opinion of Judge Jaeger is not shared by many of the judges interviewed.
The practice of NGOs' involvement in the activities of international organisations is quite common. 119 An advantage of NGOs is that they focus on a particular legal issue and can be considered experts in the area of their activity. Furthermore, they are not subordinate to the Contracting Parties and for that reason they can independently assess national laws and practice. 120 That said, NGOs are agenda-driven and, therefore, their assessment can be within one jurisdiction and lack sufficient awareness of foreign legal systems, which can lead to inadequate conclusions.
Alternatively, the ECtHR might request comparative analysis from universities. The Court has not used this theoretically available possibility so far; while on few occasions the Court has accepted third-party interventions from the universities. 122 Some of the advantages of this method of conducting comparative research are experience, independence, methodological adequacy, consistency, and flexibility. 123 However, considering the specific nature of the requests from the ECtHR, a university or any other research institution will have to put in place a rigid supervision and control mechanism, which might not be too welcome in an institution based on free and unrestrained discussion. Moreover, a university willing to handle research requests from the ECtHR could face a complicated balancing task, where it would have to weigh the amount of scarce academic resources to be invested against potential reputational risks (if research does not live up to the highest standards). jurisdiction. Within such a scheme, it is still the ECtHR which would be responsible for the comparison and, thus, the risk of undue influence on the Court is mitigated.
An obstacle to this mechanism of collecting comparative data is the absence of a clear legal basis in the Convention for such requests, which were not foreseen by the drafters of the This duty shall also apply to a Contracting Party not party to the proceedings where such cooperation is necessary.
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Among the advantages of this way of doing comparative research is that the authorities carrying out the research in the Contracting Party is very well aware of the state of the national law in respect of a particular legal issue.
As it has been demonstrated above, any comparative endeavour of the ECtHR should necessarily comply with the high standards of methodological rigour, consistency, and expertise. In order for the comparative analysis to achieve its intended effect it must not only demonstrate awareness of the diversity of approaches across jurisdictions but be supported by adequate analytical apparatus. A legitimising effect is ultimately only achieved when the stakeholders are convinced both of the decision-makers' knowledge and their ability to process and employ it.
CONCLUSION
124 Rules of Court, Rule 44A 1 . While it seems that requests of the Court to the national authorities fall within the ambit of the mentioned Rule, one can argue that the uncommon nature of these requests requires a specific rule to be added to the Rules of the Court. However, it is hard to foresee any major objections from the Contracting Parties to any such proposed scheme, since it would bring greater transparency to the proceedings within the Court. See, for example, A., B. and C. v. Ireland, supra note 93, para. 175.
The ECtHR often deploys dynamic interpretation of the ECHR. Thus, its openness to the use of comparative data is unsurprising. Indeed, considering the Court's duty to pronounce judgments applicable in 47 national jurisdictions, its recourse to comparison is arguably inevitable. Awareness of the Contracting Parties' respective legal positions allows the judges to make an informed decision. This bolsters the substantive legitimacy of ECtHR judgments.
As may be observed in the case-law, the ECtHR does not limit itself to one mode of using comparative data, namely, persuasion, but sets the European legal background, elaborates on the possible approaches to an issue, and self-reflects, for example by using the data for the informational purpose. All this falls neatly within modern trends of comparative law scholarship. National courts are engaged in a similar endeavour to the extent that they are concerned about their judgments' international recognition. Two of these techniques are most visible: 1) re-producing parts of the comparative law reports in a special section of the final judgment without mentioning them in the reasoning;
and 2) re-producing parts of these reports in a special section, while rendering such data irrelevant for certain specified reasons.
At the same time, the ECtHR faces a number of challenges if it decides to use the comparative law reports on a systematic basis. To prevent accusations of "cherry-picking" it should convincingly demonstrate the correspondence between the jurisdictions chosen and the aim pursued. The methodology of comparative analysis should be adequately followed and preference should be given to understanding the inner logic and mechanics of a particular solution rather than meticulous examination of the black letter law norms.
Profound comparative analysis is likely to demand significant resources from the Court, which is already strained by an enormous backlog. Outsourcing the burden of comparison to some third-party, such as an NGO, university, or the national authorities, might appear to be among the possible solutions. However, the ECtHR will have to weigh the potential benefits of knowledge, focus and cost-savings, against the risks of bias and damage to perceptions of its status as an impartial adjudicator. In any event, a well-designed and thorough system of quality control would have to be put in place and the necessary reforms pursued.
